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Abstract
In order to address the impact of regulation on ethical concerns of consumers, we
study the e¤ect of a minimum wage. In our experimental market, consumers have
monopsony power, rms engage in Bertrand competition, and workers are passive
recipients of a wage payment. Two treatments are employed, one with no minimum
wage in the rst part but with a minimum wage in the second part, and one treatment
with a minimum wage at the outset that is abolished in the second part. In both
treatments, wages decrease over time in the rst part even though some consumers
show an interest in fair wages. If a minimum wage is in place, wages decline even
faster. Introducing a minimum wage in a mature market raises average wages, while
abolishing it lowers them. We discuss the implications of our results, such as the
crowding out of ethical behavior through legal regulation.
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1 Introduction
In the last decades, rm policy with regard to worker protection, climate change, or other
environmental issues has received a lot of attention from the public. Firms can prot from
fair behavior towards the workers or from environment-friendly production technologies if
a su¢ cient number of consumers is willing to pay a higher price for its products than for
products of other rms. Acting according to the consumersviews of proper conduct allows
a rm to gain a reputation for being ethical. Thus, it is possible that fair behavior survives
in a market environment. However, this depends crucially on the preferences of consumers.
Consumerswillingness to pay for ethical behavior of rms expresses itself not only
in choosing to buy from rms that satisfy higher standards at higher prices, but also in
agreeing to legal regulations that are likely to result in higher prices. Freeman (1996), for
example, reports on an ABC/Washington Post poll from 1989 which posed two questions to
the public. First, it asked whether the respondents salary or the salary of someone in the
immediate family would go up if the government increases the federal minimum wage in the
US. Responses were as follows: Only in 8% of the cases the chief wage earners salary would
go up, in 12% of the cases someone else in the familys salary would go up, and in 79% the
salary of no-one in the family would go up. The same respondents were then asked whether
they would still favor raising the minimum wage if business passed the increased salary costs
on to the consumer in the form of higher prices. To this question, 82% answered with yes
while only 16% said no. The fact that the vast majority of consumers accepts higher prices
because of a raise in the minimum wage is striking as it suggests substantial willingness to
pay for fair treatment of third parties. On the other hand, this was a hypothetical question,
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and it might well be that words are not followed by deeds. We use an experiment with real
monetary incentives to study consumerswillingness to pay for proper rm conduct in a
controlled environment.
The main issue addressed by our experiment is whether regulation can undermine con-
sumerswillingness to pay for ethical rm behavior. Often governments want to ensure
certain standards of behavior by legal regulations, such as minimum wages. The e¤ects of
such interventions on consumer behavior can be ambiguous. Apart from the direct e¤ect of
the regulation, e.g. forcing rms to pay a certain minimum wage, two other e¤ects must be
considered. On the one hand, if the regulation requires a certain level of ethical behavior,
the reputation gain for rms from adhering to these (or stricter) principles of fairness might
be small. As a result, if the regulation can enforce ethical behavior only to a limited extent,
the level of ethical behavior might be lower than without the regulation. On the other hand,
the intervention by the government might send a signal that ethical conduct is important
and thus make consumers more aware and willing to hold rms to high standards. As a
result, the regulation could also increase the benets that a rm obtains from a reputation
for ethical behavior. Therefore, the regulation could actually lead consumers to enforce
fair rm behavior above the level prescribed by the regulation. Our experiment provides
evidence on the relative impact of these e¤ects.
We study a specic example, namely the issue of fair wages in a laboratory experiment.1
Some consumers may be willing to pay higher prices if they know that the rm pays its
workers a fair wage. As discussed above, implementing a minimum wage that rms have
1The main reason for studying fair wages is that other questions of ethical rm behavior such as envi-
ronmentally friendly production are very hard if not impossible to implement in a laboratory experiment.
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to pay their workers can have three e¤ects. In addition to the direct e¤ect of a binding
minimum wage, there two indirect e¤ects. On the one hand, a minimum wage might
undermine the reputational gain of a rm from paying workers a fair wage and as a result
lead to lower wages. On the other hand, it might signal to consumers that market wages
are too low. Hence, consumers will pay more attention to wages paid by rms and possibly
condition their purchase decision on them.
In the experiment, we use a simple setup to study the relationship between fairness and
regulation. Consumers have monopsony power in a Bertrand duopoly market. Workers
have no bargaining power at all as they have no decision to take. They are employed by a
rm and can neither be red nor can they quit themselves. Their only source of income is
the wage. In each duopolistic market, the consumer is informed about the prices and wages
of both rms. He can then decide which rm to buy from, and he can also split his demand
between rms. This gives the consumer the power to enforce higher wages by buying from
the rm with the higher wage.
We compare two treatments. In the rst, there is no minimum wage initially, but it
is introduced after the rst half of the experiment. In the second treatment, there is a
minimum wage at the beginning, but it is abolished after the rst half of the experiment.
This allows us to study the e¤ect of a minimum wage at di¤erent stages of experience in a
market, and the e¤ect of changes in the minimum wage policy.
We nd a signicant di¤erence between wages with and without a minimum wage in
the rst part of the experiment. In both treatments, wages start at a similar level and
decline over time. However, in the treatment with a minimum wage, wages initially (in the
rst ve periods) decline faster than in the treatment without a minimum wage. Consumer
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behavior is also di¤erent: Without a minimum wage, consumers frequently buy from the
rm with the higher price if this rm also pays the higher wage. This never happens in the
treatment with a minimum wage. Hence we do nd a substantial willingness to pay for a
better treatment of workers, as suggested in the questionnaire study by Freeman (1996),
but we also nd that this is completely undermined by the minimum wage, even though
the minimum wage is at a very low level.
In the second part of the experiment, things are di¤erent. Introducing a minimum wage
later in the experiment does not harm workers on average and helps some of them. Those
consumers who buy from rms with higher wages tend to continue to do so, while the
minimum wage becomes binding in other markets where wages have already fallen below
that level. By contrast, abolishing the minimum wage leads to a further decline in wages.
In both treatments, there is a lot of heterogeneity in behavior. Some consumers enforce
equitable wages while others buy purely according to price with no regard to the wages.
As a result, price and wage dynamics di¤er substantially among groups.
Our results support crowding out of fairness concerns, in particular if the minimum wage
is introduced at the start of the market interaction. We also nd evidence, however, for the
minimum wage to become binding and hence to increase wages. Moreover, it can help to
establish a standard for fair wages above the minimum wage in markets where consumers
have already experienced a situation without a minimum wage. This last nding suggests
that the economic policy of introducing a minimum wage not only changes the set of actions
but also the perceptions of fairness in a market.
Experimental evidence has shown repeatedly that many peoples choices cannot be
reconciled with purely selsh preferences. In the dictator game (e.g. Forsythe, Horowitz,
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Savin and Sefton 1994, Roth 1995) proposers often allocate positive amounts of money
to another player which is in line with other-regarding preferences. In the light of this
literature it is not unexpected that consumers care about the wage of the worker.
The game used here is more closely related to the three-person ultimatum game by
Güth and van Damme (1998) where the proposer can allocate money to a responder and
to a dummy. The responder can accept or reject the proposal and the dummy is passive
although his payo¤ depends on the actions of the other players. Experimental tests of
this game show that the responder earns more than the dummy on average, see Güth
and van Damme (1998) and Güth, Schmidt and Sutter (2007). This suggests that the
responderswillingness to punish proposers for the sake of the dummy player is limited.
On the other hand, in a third-party punishment game (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004), where
a third player can punish the dictator in a two-person dictator game after he has made
the choice, unequal splits are frequently punished and dictators frequently split the pie
equally. In our experiment, since a consumer can choose between two rms he can use
competition between them to play them o¤ against each other. In contrast to the three-
person ultimatum game and the third-party punishment game, he can punish an unfair
rm by switching to the less unfair rm. This makes punishment quite e¤ective and could
thus lead to a strong impact of consumersfairness concerns.2
There is a growing literature on crowding out of intrinsic motivation with extrinsic
2All these experiments nd evidence for an indirectly reciprocal motivation of participants, because
they reward or punish friendly or unfriendly acts between two other participants, that do not a¤ect them
directly. See, for example, Nowak and Sigmund (1998), Seinen and Schram (2006), and Engelmann and
Fischbacher (2003) for the literature on indirect reciprocity.
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or economic incentives.3 A recent publication studying the interaction between intrinsic
motivation and formal rules is Falk and Kosfeld (2006). They examine the impact of the
principals choice to restrict the possible choices of the agent on the e¤ort level of the
agent. They nd that the intention of the principal matters, i.e. the crowding-out e¤ect
of restricting the agents choice set critically depends on the principal actually taking this
choice instead of an exogenous change in the choice set. By contrast, the minimum wage
in our experiment is introduced or abolished exogenously, i.e. by the experimenter, but we
nd that it can nevertheless a¤ect behavior adversely.
There is little experimental work on the e¤ects of minimum wages yet. A notable
exception is the study by Falk, Fehr and Zehnder (2006) which focuses on the impact of
a minimum wage on the reservation wage of workers and on their fairness perceptions.
Brandts and Charness (2004) investigate the e¤ect of a minimum wage in a labor market
characterized by gift exchange between workers and employers. Note that in contrast to
these two studies, we focus on the consumersreaction to a minimum wage, not the workers.
A large portion of the empirical literature on minimum wages investigates the employ-
ment e¤ect of raising the minimum wage. This has been rather controversial (Card 1992,
Card and Krueger 1994, Dickens, Machin, and Manning 1999). In our experimental design,
employment is exogenously xed to keep the question of what a fair wage is simple for the
consumers. Empirical studies on the minimum wage have also observed so-called spillover
e¤ects. An increase in the minimum wage has been found to increase wages by more than
the required amount (Card and Krueger 1995, Katz and Krueger 1992). We can study this
3See Frey (1997), Frey and Jegen (2001), Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) and (2000b). See also Ostrom
(2000) for a discussion.
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issue with our experimental data and indeed observe that consumers and rms are willing
to pay more than the minimum wage under certain conditions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the design in detail.
In Section 3 we present and analyze the results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
We study a simple duopoly market. There is one consumer, who can buy up to 10 units
of a ctitious homogeneous good. Each unit has a value of 25 points for the consumer.
There are two rms, each represented by a manager who takes the decisions for the rm.4
Each rm employs one worker. This worker is an actual participant in the experiment, even
though he has no choice to make. The rm can produce up to 10 units of the good. The
rm chooses a price (per unit) p 2 [0; 50] and a wage w (per unit). If no minimum wage is
in place, then w 2 [0; 50]; otherwise w 2 [3; 50]; that is the minimum wage is 3 if it is in
place. The rm cannot price discriminate, i.e., the same price-wage combination holds for
all 10 units, and the rms do not have an option to restrict supply. Wages are paid only for
units actually sold and there are no other costs. Workers have no costs, no other source of
income than the wage, and no outside option. If a consumer buys a unit from a rm that
has chosen price p and wage w; the consumer earns 25   p for this unit, the rm makes
a prot of p   w and the worker earns w: These earnings are multiplied by the purchased
number of units in order to compute total earnings in a period.
4In the following, we refer to the manager as the rmsince he is the player acting on behalf of it.
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The timing of the game is as follows. After the rms have made their choices, the
consumer is informed about both rmsprice-wage pairs (p1; w1) and (p2; w2). He then
decides how many units to buy from the rms. The consumer can buy any combination
of integer amounts from the two rms up to a total quantity of 10, and he can also buy
no units at all. At the end of each period all participants in the group are informed about
all decisions in the group, i.e., about both rmsprice-wage combinations and about the
decision of the consumer.
In the subgame-perfect Nash-equilibrium of the stage game with selsh agents, rms set
w = 0 if there is no minimum wage and w = 3 if there is a minium wage. The equilibrium
price is p = w or p = w + 1 (with p1 = p2) and the consumer always buys 10 units from
the cheaper rm as long as min(p1; p2) < 25 for this rm, buys nothing if min(p1; p2) > 25
for both rms and an arbitrary quantity if min(p1; p2) = 25: If both rms choose the same
price, in equilibrium the consumer can split his demand in an arbitrary way between the two
rms. Hence, in equilibrium almost the whole surplus goes to the consumer.5 By contrast,
the payo¤s are split equally among all ve market participants if both rms choose p = 20;
w = 10 and the consumer buys 5 units from each of the rms. In this case the payo¤ for all
participants is  = 10  5 = 50: Hence the minimum wage is substantially below the wage
that would ensure equal payo¤s.
Note that as long as the consumer buys 10 units, the total earnings in the market are
constant. How a consumer spreads his purchases across the two rms does not a¤ect the
5As the stage game has two equilibria with p = w or p = w + 1, collusive equilibria exist due to the
possibility to punish deviations. While our main focus is on wages, we note that we do not nd evidence
of collusive rm behavior since most of the surplus does in fact go to the consumers (see below).
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total earnings. This has the appealing property that we can study consumersconcerns for
fairness that are not confounded with concerns for e¢ ciency.6
Details of the implementation are as follows. We use a xed-matching protocol, that
is a group of ve participants (one consumer and two rm-worker pairs) stays together for
the whole course of the experiment. The main motivation for xed groups is that we are
interested in the degree to which consumer behavior drives rm behavior. This is obviously
more relevant if the rms meet the same consumers many times. Participants keep their
role for the whole experiment in order to enhance the possible inequalities and fairness
concerns. The experiment lasts for 40 periods.
An interesting aspect of our setting is that consumers do not have an incentive to signal
that they care about fairness if in fact they do not. This is in contrast to many other
experiments that try to assess the fairness concerns of players such as ultimatum, trust
and gift-exchange games. In these games, signalling typically increases the extent of fair
behavior in early periods of repeated games. In our experiment, since higher wages translate
at least to some degree into higher prices, selsh consumers want to signal that they do not
care about the worker but only about low prices.
We conducted two treatments. In treatment NMF (No Minimum wage First), there is
initially no minimum wage, but it is introduced after the rst 20 periods. In treatment
MF (Minimum wage First), there is initially a minimum wage in place, but it is abolished
6See Kritikos and Bolle (2001), Charness and Rabin (2002), Engelmann and Strobel (2004), and Harrison
and Johnson (2006) for evidence that experimental subjects frequently exhibit preferences to maximize the
total payo¤. These papers show that the interpretation of many experimental results as evidence for fairness
concerns is problematic since fairness concerns are frequently confounded with concerns for e¢ ciency.
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after 20 periods. At the beginning of the experiment, the participants are informed that
there will be a change in the rules after 20 periods without mentioning that this change
concerns the minimum wage. They are also informed that the group composition and
the role assignment will not be changed. We implemented a market frame, that is in the
instructions (for the full text see the Appendix), participants are called consumers, rms
and workers and we use the terms pricesand wages. The minimum wage is introduced
as follows. In treatment MF, it is stated that the wage has to equal at least 3. After the
rst 20 periods, participants in treatment NMF are informed that from now on the wage
has to be at least 3, and in treatment MF instructions specify that the wage only has to be
non-negative.
For each treatment, we ran ve sessions with two groups of ve participants each. Hence
we have ten independent observations per treatment and a total of 100 subjects (40 of which
are workers who do not take any decisions). The experiments were conducted in a computer
lab at Technical University Berlin in December 2004 and February 2005. The experimental
software was programmed and the experiment was run using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
At the end of the experiments, earnings in points where converted at a rate of 200 points
= 1 Euro and were paid in cash immediately after the experiment. Participants received
5 Euro in points as an initial endowment. This serves to cover possible losses (if rms sell
below the wage or consumers buy for a price above their valuation) and to ensure that
workers get at least some non-trivial compensation.7 The sessions took between 60 and
7Paying the workers a higher initial endowment was not feasible, because it would obviously have changed
the egalitarian price-wage combination and more importantly would have reduced any fairness motivation





















Figure 1: Average wages over time
70 minutes and average earnings were 14.31 Euro in Treatment NMF and 14.65 Euro in
Treatment MF (including the initial endowment).8
with the fact that they had no choice to make and also earned only marginally more than their initial
endowment. This, however, was a necessary consequence of translating the situation of powerless workers
into a laboratory setting.
8If the consumers buy ten units (all other decisions determine only the distribution among players), the
average payo¤s are 10 Euro plus 5 Euro initial capital. The slightly lower earnings that we observe result




Our main results are summarized in Figure 1, which shows the development of average
wage o¤ers in the two treatments across time. The wages reported here are those set by the
rms, not only the wages that were actually paid.9 Average wage o¤ers start at a similar
level in both treatments and are very close to the equitable wage of 10. However, they
fall substantially almost immediately in treatment NMF and even faster in treatment MF
with a minimum wage in place. In spite of the fact that the minimum wage provides a
lower bound for the wages in treatment MF, the average wage is lower than in treatment
NMF in all but two of the rst 20 periods. This holds even though the wages fall below 3
in several of the groups of treatment NMF. Similarly, as displayed in Table 1, the average
wage over all 20 periods in the rst part of the experiment is higher in treatment NMF
than in treatment MF.
To understand the wage dynamics better, we take a closer look at the development
across periods. We run random-e¤ects panel data regressions, using each independent
market (with two sellers) as an independent observation
wageit =  MFit +   Periodit +   (MF  Period)it + i + "it
9We observe some cases where it appears that a participant in the role of the rm confused wage and
price. One player did this consistently for a number of periods and after the experiment admitted doing
so. For other participants we infer this, because for one period they reverse a price-wage pattern that they
have chosen before and afterwards. We generally excluded these observations from the analysis of price and
wage choices. Including them, however, neither a¤ects any of our results qualitatively nor the signicance
of any of the treatment di¤erences.
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Periods 1-20 Periods 21-40
NMF 6.57 6.06
MF 5.03 2.72
Table 1: Average wages by treatment and phase (not weighted by quantities purchased)
where MF is a dummy that equals 1 for treatment MF and 0 for treatment NMF and
MF  period is the interaction e¤ect of this dummy and the period.10 Figure 1 suggests
that the wage initially falls faster in MF. To capture these di¤erent developments, we run
the regressions for the whole rst half of the experiment (periods 1-20), for periods 1-10
only and for periods 1-5 only. The results are in Table 2. When considering only the rst
ve periods, there is a much faster decline of wages in MF than in NMF, and the decline
in NMF is not signicant.11 Considering periods 1 to 10 suggests wages do not decline at a
signicantly di¤erent rate. Taking the rst 20 periods into account, due to the steep initial
drop and relatively at development afterwards, the regression suggests that wages in MF
are initially lower but decline less rapidly than in NMF. To summarize, in the treatment
with a minimum wage wages decline rapidly , and the decline then comes almost to a stop.
Without a minimum wage, the decline is slower and more stable.
We observe that wages decrease in both treatments in early periods. This can be
10Fixed e¤ects models yield similar results, and the MF dummy is dropped since it does not vary within
independent observations.
11Using a Mann-Whitney test, the di¤erence between wages in both treatments for the rst twenty, rst
ten or rst ve periods misses to be signicantly di¤erent from zero (p > 0:1, marginally in the case of the
rst ten periods). For all Mann-Whitney tests in this paper, we use group averages to ensure independence
of the data.
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# Observations 761 373 181 793 394
R2 0.1189 0.1317 0.1262 0.2245 0.1952
Table 2: Coe¢ cients for regression of the wage depending on the treatment, the period
as well as the interaction between both. Standard errors in parantheses, *: signicant at
p < 0:1, **: signicant at p < 0:05, ***: signicant at p < 0:01. Note that for the second
part of the experiment, the time variable is taken as period -20 in order to capture the
treatment di¤erence at the start of the second half in the variable MF.
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interpreted as some rms initially expecting consumers to be more concerned with fair wages
than they actually are. When they discover that consumers frequently are not concerned
with wages but only with prices, they lower the wage and the price. Since consumer behavior
is less driven by wages in MF (see Section 3.3), wages decline even faster than in NMF.
In addition, rms might hold overly optimistic beliefs about the fairness of the competing
rm. When they learn that the other rm does not pay a high wage (in combination with
a high price), they reduce their wage and price as well. An alternative explanation would
be that relatively high initial wages are driven by confusion and rms learn over the rst
periods that paying positive wages only lowers their prots. This does not explain, however,
why wages initially decline faster in MF, and it is also not in line with rising wages in the
second part of treatment NMF as described below.
Observation 1: Average wage o¤ers in the rst part of the experiment (periods 1-20)
are higher in the treatment without a minimum wage (NMF) than in the treatment with a
minimum wage (MF). In both treatments wages decline over the rst 20 periods, and they
decline more rapidly in the rst periods of the treatment with a minimum wage (MF) than
without a minimum wage (NMF).
Now focus on the second part of the experiment (periods 21-40) where a minimum wage
is introduced in treatment NMF and the minimum wage is removed in treatment MF. A
Mann-Whitney test yields a signicant di¤erence in wages between the two treatments in
the second half of the experiment (p < 0:05), with higher wages in treatment NMF with a
minimum wage. The minimum wage in treatment NMF stabilizes the wages signicantly
above the level in MF and thus has a positive e¤ect on the workersearnings. The panel
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regressions reported in the last two columns of Table 2 reveal the temporal aspect of this
di¤erence: Wages are signicantly lower in MF than in NMF already in period 21. Moreover,
there is a slight, but signicant increase over time in NMF, but not in MF.12 Interestingly, as
shown in the last column, there is no signicant time trend in periods 21-30, so the upward
trend materializes primarily in the last ten periods. This can also be seen in Figure 1.
Thus, the di¤erence established between the treatments is increasing and would hence be
likely to persist over more periods of play.
To explain these results, notice that wages have decreased sharply in both treatments
until period 20, i.e. by the end of the rst part of the experiment. In period 21, there is
not much fair behavior left in both treatments. Thus, the minimum wage is often binding
and thus has a positive e¤ect on wages. The minimum wage, however, also a¤ects behavior
when it is not binding. This becomes evident in the upward movement of wages in the last
periods of treatment NMF where a minimum wage is in place. Here, the minimum wage
might strengthen fairness concerns of consumers who have experienced an unregulated
market rst in which they already developed a sense of responsibility for the worker.
Observation 2: In the second part of the experiment (periods 21-40), wages are on
average higher in treatment NMF with a minimum wage than in treatment MF without a
minimum wage. Moreover, this di¤erence is increasing over time.
What is the overall e¤ect of a minimum wage, taking together both parts of the exper-
iment? A panel regression yields a highly signicant di¤erence between wages (p < 0:001),
such that there is an overall positive e¤ect of the minimum wage. Thus, the lower wages in
12Note that the interaction term MF  Period almost completely cancels the coe¢ cient of Period.
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the rst part with a minimum wage are overcompensated by the higher wages in the second
part with a minimum wage.
Finally, which treatment, NMF or MF, leads to higher wages? Or, in other words, what
is the e¤ect of ordering the two regimes in one way or the other on wage o¤ers? Based on
a Mann-Whitney test, we nd that wages are signicantly higher in treatment NMF than
in treatment MF (p < 0:05). This is due to the initially lower wage in MF than in NMF
and the higher wage in NMF than in MF in the second part of the experiment where the
minimum wage is often binding.
We further make the important observation that the groups in treatment NMF are
very heterogenous both with respect to the wages in the rst 20 periods as well as in
their reaction to the introduction of a minimum wage. We calculate group averages across
blocks of ve periods and consider in particular the last block in the rst part (periods
16-20) and in the second part (periods 36-40), see Table 3. In two of the groups, the
average wage is close to the equitable wage of 10. One of them (#1) is una¤ected by
the introduction of the minimum wage. In the other group (#9) the wage increases even
further. It appears that these groups have established a norm for a fair wage where the
introduction of a (substantially lower) minimum wage has little e¤ect or even strengthens
the norm. Two groups (#4;#10) have wages substantially above the level of the minimum
wage but substantially below the equitable wage by the end of the rst part. In both
groups, the introduction of a minimum wage leads to a decline of wages, but it increases
again towards the end of the second part and ends substantially above the minimum wage.
It appears that consumers in these groups attempt to establish fair wages but that there
is no well-established norm and that the introduction of the minimum wage provides a
18
NMF
Group Periods 1-20 Periods 16-20 Periods 21-40 Periods 36-40
1 10.03 9.8 10 10
2 5.98 4.5 7.31 6.4
3 3.36 0.3 3 3
4 7 5.9 5 6.6
5 4.78 1.75 3.53 3.6
6 2.7 1.9 4.08 4.2
7 8.11 4.3 6.3 8.3
8 3.87 3.8 4.03 4.6
9 13.16 10.4 13.38 15.1
10 7.1 7.4 4.05 5.4
Total 6.57 5.07 6.06 6.72
MF
1 6.18 5.1 4.68 5.7
2 5.4 3.2 3 3.4
3 6.18 6.11 4.88 4.7
4 4.72 3 0.28 0.7
5 6 3 1.18 0.7
6 3.16 3 0.9 1
7 5.54 6.5 5.38 3.6
8 5.26 5 2.94 1.9
9 3.82 3.7 1.03 1.67
10 3.93 3.1 2.9 3.7
Total 5.03 4.19 2.72 2.72
Table 3: Average wages (not weighted by quantities purchased and excluding obvious errors
by rms) for treatments NMF and MF for the rst part and the second part as well as for
the last ve periods in each part.
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temporary focal point for rms to set a low wage. In the long run relatively fairer wages
get established again. In two groups (#2;#7) wages are slightly above the level of the
minimum wage at the end of the rst part, but increase substantially after the introduction
of the minimum wage. In these groups, the minimum wage appears to help establish a norm
for a fair wage that is substantially higher than the minimum wage. Notice that in this case
the minimum wage seems to a¤ect behavior even though it is not binding. Finally, in the
last four groups (#3;#5;#6;#8) the wage has fallen to below or near the minimum wage
level by the end of the rst part. Thus, the minimum wage becomes binding (or nearly
binding).
To summarize, treatment NMF suggests that introducing a minimum wage in groups
that have reached a stable wage level does not a¤ect the subjectsbehavior. However, the
minimum wage can, at least temporarily, interfere with fair wage-setting in groups that are
still somewhat less settled. On the other hand, the minimum wage can help establish a fair
wage level or simply become binding in groups that have not paid fair wages so far. Thus
the e¤ects of introducing a minimum wage in markets that have been running for a while
appears to be mostly neutral, occasionally benecial and only rarely problematic.
In stark contrast to treatment NMF, the groups in treatment MF are more homogeneous,
with six groups exactly at the minimum wage or close to it and none with an average above
7 in the last periods of the rst part, see Table 3. Thus it appears that if a minimum wage is
in place before the group can develop its own standard of a fair wage, this frequently leads to
crowding out of fairness. The reaction to the abolishment of the minimum wage is, however,
heterogenous. In four groups (#4;#5;#6;#9), the wage deteriorates further, suggesting
that in these groups fairness considerations are almost irrelevant and have perhaps been
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completely undermined by the minimum wage. In the other two groups (#2;#10) the
average wage is virtually una¤ected, suggesting that the minimum wage was established
as a norm for an acceptable wage in these groups. This indicates that fairness concerns
play some role in these groups. Among the remaining four groups where average wages
are substantially higher than the minimum wage in the rst part, we observe a substantial
decline in the average wage in one group (#8), with even lower wages in the last ve periods,
while in the other three groups (#1;#3;#7), there is only a slight decrease in wages from
the rst to the second part and no clear pattern in the last ve periods.
We note that in all 10 groups in treatment MF the average wage in the second part is
lower than in the rst part (though this is not always true for the last ve periods in each
part). This is in clear contrast to Treatment NMF, where the average wage is higher in the
second than in the rst part for four groups. To summarize, abolishing a minimum wage
never has a positive e¤ect. It has no e¤ect on some groups that have apparently settled at
a wage near or above the minimum wage, but often leads to a deterioration of wages if the
minimum wage has been binding.
3.2 Prices
How do rms choose prices and wages, and what is the relationship between the two? A rm
receives the price p and has to pay the wage w per unit of output sold. If a rm increases
or decreases its price, it can hold its prot constant by moving the wage up or down by
the same amount. For example, when competition forces the rm to set lower prices, it
could secure itself a constant prot by lowering the wage. Alternatively, rms might look
at their two choices separately. This aspect of rm strategy can be analyzed by looking at
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Periods 1-20 Periods 21-40
NMF 0:7776 0:7012
MF 0:4664 0:4626
Table 4: Correlations between wages and prices. All coe¢ cients are signicant at p < 0:05.
the correlation between price and wage for both rms. We nd a clear correlation between
wages and prices for all parts of the experiment. Considering all decisions of rms in all
periods, the correlation coe¢ cient is 0:6319 (p < 0:05). Table 4 shows that the correlations
are strong and signicant for each of the di¤erent parts of the experiment.13 The coe¢ cients
are slightly lower in treatment MF with a minimum wage rst.
As can be taken from Table 5, in the rst part of the experiment (periods 1-20) prices are
higher in NMF than in MF. The same is true for the second part of the experiment where
prices in NMF exceed prices in MF. According to Mann-Whitney tests, the di¤erences are
not signicant in either part or across the whole experiment (p > 0:1). Random-e¤ects
panel data regressions as above, however, show that in the rst part, prices in MF are
signicantly lower (p < 0:05), and decrease over time in both treatments (p < 0:001) with
no signicant di¤erence between time trends in the treatments. Similarly in the second
part, prices are overall lower in MF (p < 0:1) and decrease over time in both treatments
(p < 0:05) with no signicant di¤erence in time trends between treatments.
Observation 3: (i) Price and wage choices by rms are strongly positively correlated.
(ii) Prices are higher in both parts of the treatment without a minimum wage rst (NMF)
13As the test does not take into account the dependence of observations, the signicance levels should be
interpreted with caution.
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Periods 1-20 Periods 21-40
NMF 14.89 13.31
MF 12.12 9.76
Table 5: Average prices by treatment and part of the experiment (not weighted by quantities
purchased)
than in the treatment with a minimum wage rst (MF).
Given the close correlation between wages and prices, the results on prices mirror the
results from the section on wages. Thus, a minimum wage typically increases prices if it
increases the wages, but it can also decrease prices when it crowds out fairness and thereby
reduces wage payments. We observe that the correlation between prices and wages is lower
in treatment MF than in treatment NMF in both parts of the experiment. This suggests
that the subjects view the choices of wage and price more as separate decisions when a
minimum wage is in place from the beginning of the experiment on.
Since both wages and prices are generally lower in MF than in NMF, the question arises
whether rms are better o¤ if wages are lower or whether the benet goes exclusively to
consumers in the form of lower prices. Obviously the lower wages in MF translate into
lower earnings for workers and the lower prices into a higher rent for consumers. Table 6
shows the rm prots, worker earnings and consumer surplus by treatment for both parts
of the experiment. Five results are noteworthy. First, in treatment NMF, the distribution
of surplus does not di¤er much between both parts of the experiment. That is, neither do
workers on average su¤er or benet from the introduction of a minimum wage, nor does
it a¤ect the average rm or consumer substantially. Second, rms benet and workers
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Periods 1-20 Periods 21-40
rm worker consumer rm worker consumer
NMF 28.31 31.21 108.84 30.43 29.12 118.65
MF 15.26 25.68 156.24 26.34 12.8 166.09
Table 6: Average payo¤s per period by treatment and phase. From left to right each row
shows average rm prot, average worker earnings and average consumer surplus.
su¤er from the abolition of the minimum wage in the second part of MF. Third, in both
treatments the bulk of the surplus is captured by consumers. Fourth, consumers capture
an even larger share of the total surplus in MF (about two thirds) than in NMF (about
half).14 Fifth, rms do not prot from the lower wages in both parts of MF compared
to NMF. This suggests that the di¤erent price and wage patterns between treatments are
driven by di¤erences in consumer behavior and not, for example, by collusion of rms on
low wages.15 We address the consumer behavior in the next subsection.
3.3 Consumer behavior
Finally, let us focus on the choices of consumers in both treatments. The most striking
di¤erence is found with respect to the willingness of consumers to pay a higher price if
14Remember that there are two rms and two workers, but only one consumer in each market. Thus
when a consumer captures half of the total surplus, he earns four times as much as the average of the other
market participants and eight times as much if he captures two thirds of the total.
15The argument underlying this alternative explanation would be that a minimum wage provides a focal
point for collusion of rms on low wages. This explanation is not supported. Similarly, related experiments
do not provide evidence that price oors (Dufwenberg et al., 2006) and price ceilings (Engelmann and
Müller, 2007) help rms to collude by providing a focal point.
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Periods 1-20 Periods 21-40
NMF 25.5% 25.4%
MF 0% 21.3%
Table 7: Percentage of consumers buying more units from the rm with the higher wage
and price
the respective rm pays a higher wage. In the rst half of treatment NMF, consumers
buy more units from the rm with a higher wage and higher price than from the rm
with the lower wage and price in 25.5% of cases where this is possible and seven of ten
consumers do this at least once.16 In stark contrast to this result, consumers never do this
in the rst part of treatment MF. This di¤erence is highly signicant (MW-test, p < 0:01),
which suggests that fairness concerns of consumers are crowed out by the minimum wage.
Consumer behavior in the second part is very similar to consumer behavior in the rst part
of NMF (see Table 7) and far from being di¤erent between treatments (MW-test, p > 0:8).
Observation 4: (i) In the rst part of the experiment, consumers never buy from the
rm with the higher price and the higher wage in the treatment with a minimum wage (MF)
while they do so signicantly more often if there is no minimum wage (NMF). (ii) In the
second part of the experiment, consumer behavior is statistically indistinguishable in this
respect between treatments NMF and MF.
16In many cases, we cannot assess whether the consumer would be willing to pay a higher price for a
higher wage because the rms set equal prices, or equal wages, or the rm with the higher wage charges
the lower price. Out of 200 choices made by consumers in the rst part of the experiment, there were 97
cases in Treatment NMF and 64 in Treatment MF with a high-wage high-price rm.
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It appears that consumers who are initially willing to buy from a high-wage high-price
rm are not discouraged to do so by the introduction of a minimum wage. On the other
hand, consumers starting the experiment with a minimum wage do not choose the high-
price high-wage rm, but they start to do so after the abolition of the minimum wage. This
suggests that they initially consider workers to be su¢ ciently protected by the minimum
wage so that they do not have to buy from rms with high wages in order to support
workers. After the abolition of the minimum wage, however, some consumers are willing to
pay a higher price, apparently in order to prevent a further decline of wages.
In addition to considering whether consumers buy more at the high-price high-wage
rm, we consider how consumers spread their purchases across rms in general. Remember
that they can buy up to 10 units per period and can spread these units as they like between
the two rms. In MF, consumers actually buy 10 units in 94% of the cases, in NMF this
is the case in only 81%. Overall, the only purchasing patterns occurring frequently are
either to buy 10 units at one rm (71% in MF and 53% in NMF) or to buy equal numbers
of units at both rms (16% in MF and 24% in NMF, including buying nothing at both
in 1% and 2% of the cases, respectively). Of the cases where consumers spread purchases
equally, the vast majority (74%) occurs when prices are equal, while this can almost never
be observed when prices di¤er by more than 3 points. Spreading purchases equally can
be seen as another indication of fairness concerns, since the consumer equalizes payo¤s
between rms (and between workers in case wages are equal as well). It is in line with the
previous results of the paper that consumers more frequently buy an equal number of units
at both rms in NMF than in MF, indicating that in this treatment they care more about
fairness. Similarly, buying less than 10 units can be a signal that consumers consider prices
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as too high or wages as too low at both rms which occurs more frequently in NMF than
in MF.
Figure 2 shows the frequency with which consumers buy a di¤erent number of units at
the two rms depending on the di¤erence between the price of the rm where they buy more
(pm) and the price of the rm where they buy less (pl). While consumers overwhelmingly
buy more units at the (weakly) cheaper rm (pm  pl), we also see that they buy far more
frequently at the more expensive rm in NMF than in MF, in particular in the rst part. In
MF, we do not observe any case where consumers buy more at a rm with a substantially
higher price (pm > pl + 3). Furthermore, in the rst part of MF there is only one case
where a consumer buys more at a moderately more expensive rm (pl < pm  pl+3). This
indicates clearly that in the rst part of MF the primary criterion for the consumers is the
price, which is not exclusively true in the second part and much less so in NMF.
4 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
We have studied the e¤ects of a minimum wage in a simple market experiment with two
sellers, a monopsonistic buyer, and passive workers. The latter two features as well as xed
matching and low equilibrium earnings for the worker are chosen in order to maximize the
likelihood that the consumers care about the workerswell-being by buying from the rm
that pays a higher wage. We can then study the interaction of such fairness concerns with
a minimum wage.
We observe that there is a lot of heterogeneity among consumers, ranging from purely
selsh behavior to some consumers who enforce an equal distribution of payo¤s. Inter-
estingly, the latter behavior is not observed if a minimum wage is in place already at the
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Figure 2: Frequency of consumers buying more at one rm depending on the di¤erence
between the price where the consumer buys more (pm) and the price where the consumer
buys less (pl) by treatment and phase. The left bar captures the cases where the consumer
buys more at the (weakly) cheaper rm (pm  pl), the second bar the cases where the
consumer buys more at a moderately more expensive rm (pl < pm  pl + 3) and the right
bar the cases where the consumer buys at a substantially more expensive rm (pm > pl+3).
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beginning of the experiment. This suggests that the minimum wage signals to consumers
that the workerswell-being is su¢ ciently taken care o¤ such that there is no need to pay
a high price to a rm that pays fair wages. Firms seem to learn this as the wages decline
faster in the treatment with a minimum wage in the rst part of the experiment than in
the treatment without a minimum wage at rst. This observation supports our hypothesis
that legal regulations can lead to crowding out of concerns for fairness.
In contrast to the detrimental e¤ects of a minimum wage at an early stage of the
experiment, a later introduction of the minimum wage has a positive e¤ect on the average
wage level. The reason is that markets where relatively fair wages have been established
are hardly a¤ected by a minimum wage while it is binding in other markets with rather
low wages. Therefore, the overall e¤ect of a minimum wage seems to depend on existing
standards of fairness in the market. In a mature state where some consumers have clearly
established standards for ethical behavior and rms can thus prot from paying a fair
wage, these standards are not undermined by the introduction of regulations. On the
other hand, if the regulation is introduced at an early stage, it is harder for rms to
establish a reputation for ethical behavior for two reasons. First, it becomes more di¢ cult
to distinguish themselves from rms that only satisfy the legal minimum in the presence of
a minimum wage. Second, consumers might believe that the issue is su¢ ciently taken care
o¤ by the regulation.17
Naturally, one should take great care in deriving policy implications from a highly
17In the framework of our experiment this means that a consumer who has established that she considers
w = 10 a fair wage is not very likely to change her opinion by the introduction of a minimum wage of 3,
whereas if she is confronted with an initial minimum wage of 3, she might consider this as su¢ cient.
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stylized experimental setting such as ours. Our experiment primarily serves as an exis-
tence proof for the possibility that the regulation of ethicalbehavior can undermine the
reputation gains that rms obtain from such ethical behavior. Such e¤ects can, at least
temporarily, lead to worse outcomes than without the regulation. Furthermore, it shows
that the overall e¤ect of a regulation can depend on the maturity of the market and es-
tablished standards of behavior. Our results suggest that the most e¤ective way to attain
ethical behavior by rms would be to rst let the market operate without any regulations
in order to let some rms establish a reputation for ethical behavior. If the overall result
is not satisfactory, regulation can be introduced to improve the behavior of the remaining
rms, without threatening the reputation of those rms who are already fullling or over-
fullling the desired standard of behavior. Furthermore, our results suggest that removing
the regulation can lead to poor outcomes for the workers. Possibly, the removal of the
minimum wage signals that there is no need for a higher wage (any more).
Several limitations of our study should be mentioned. They leave ample room for more
research on the topic at hand. One of the issues where our experiment deviates from most
real markets is the presence of a monopsonistic buyer. This design element maximizes the
power of the buyer to inuence rm behavior. If there are many buyers, free-rider and
coordination problems must be overcome because an individual buyers inuence on the
behavior of the rms can be negligible while her own costs of buying from an ethical
rm can be substantial. Thus, our study is not meant to provide a realistic measure of the
amount of fairness per se, but it is designed to investigate the interaction between fairness
concerns of consumers and legal regulations.
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Another feature of our experiment is Bertrand competition between rms. Firms have
no market power and therefore little room for fairness. We chose Bertrand competition to
focus our study on consumers and their concerns for fairness. With market power, rms
could in principle pay for fair behavior even if the consumers do not value it. It remains
to be investigated how the rmswillingness to pay for fairness is a¤ected by the form of
competition, legal institutions, etc.
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